The debate on the sharing economy in Belgium has been mainly focused on its economic, quantitative, and digital aspects. Given the fact that the adoption of the sharing economy has accelerated lately, this report wanted to contribute to further open up the debate on the adoption of this economy in relation to an aspect that is too little discussed, namely sustainability. Based on some smaller studies, this report identifies different drivers for concrete sustainable sharing economy initiatives to develop that situate (...) themselves on the level of people’s daily life practices, social and cultural developments, and policy developments. Next to these drivers, there were issues detected that interact closely with the further development of this economy. The report ends with a suggestion for more systematic research of the drivers behind the initiation, adoption, and sustaining of sharing economy initiatives and their contributions to a more sustainable Belgian society. (shrink)

In various of my writings, both in Philosophical Studies and elsewhere, I have argued that an account of trying sentences is available that does not require quantification over alleged attempts or tryings. In particular, adverbial modification in such sentences can be dealt with, without quantification over any such particulars. In ‘Attempts’, Jonathan D. Payton (Payton, 2021) has sought to dispute my claim. In this paper, I consider his claims and reply to them. I believe that my account withstands such scrutiny.

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con- reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory (...) role not played by pro- reasons. Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con- reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con- reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic. (shrink)